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1.1 Focus of the paper 
According to the EEA Agreement, EFTA States who are part of the Agreement are obliged to 
implement and apply EU legal acts that have been incorporated into the Agreement by the EEA Joint 
Committee. The EFTA Surveillance Authority (ESA) has, on several occasions, confronted the EFTA 
States on issues where they have failed to live up to this obligation. In addition, the last published ESA 
Scoreboard shows that Iceland currently has the highest transposition deficit of the three EFTA States, 
as well as the most infringement proceedings directed towards them from ESA.1 In addition to this, a 
letter from ESA addressed to Iceland last summer implies that Iceland has difficulties in fulfilling 
obligations of the EEA Agreement.2 As I will suggest in this study, it seems as Iceland has even more 
difficulties than Norway in this regard.  
The subject of this study is how Iceland and Norway ensure effectiveness and influence of EEA law. 
National courts can play an important part where other institutions have not managed to abide by 
international obligations, by being an important «institutional force» in safeguarding international rule 
of law.3 For that reason, when analysing the influence of EEA law in Iceland and Norway, it is 
interesting to look at the role of the national courts in ensuring effectiveness of EEA law. Thus, the 
objective of the study is to conduct a comparison between Icelandic and Norwegian court practice. 
The principle of consistent interpretation can contribute to ensure full effectiveness of EEA law. In 
Norway this method of interpretation is practiced through the principle of presumption 
(presumsjonsprinsippet), and in Iceland it is described as a rule of interpretation (skýringarreglan). 
How these principles are defined and practiced in the two countries will be analysed and discussed in 
this paper. This is to answer the question of how the national courts of Iceland and Norway act when 
domestic law appears not to be in line with EEA law because of non-implemented or wrongly 
implemented EEA rules. The objective is both to identify which rules apply in such a situation, as well 
as to show how they are practiced. 
Three Icelandic cases4 stand out as good examples of situations where Icelandic provisions seemed to 
be in conflict with EEA law. The Gunnarsson case concerned Mr. Gunnarsson’s claim to deem a 
taxation decision by the Icelandic authorities invalid and a breach of EEA law, as he had been denied 
                                                
1 ESA Scoreboard July 2016. 
2 ESA Letter 2016. 
3 Nollkaemper 2011 p. 1. 
4 Hrd. 2 October 2014 (92/2013) Gunnarsson, Hrd. 28 October 2013 (552/2013) Commerzbank and Hrd. 8 May 
2014 (120/2014) Nederlandsche Bank. 
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tax relief due to him residing in Denmark. Commerzbank and Nederlandsche Bank both dealt with 
foreign banks’ claims to set-offs against Icelandic banks in the aftermath of the financial crisis. In all 
three cases the Icelandic Supreme Court concluded that they could not interpret domestic provisions in 
line with Iceland’s EEA obligations, and, therefore; none of the cases ended with an EEA conform 
result. The decisions have been widely criticised, including by ESA. In the previously mentioned ESA 
letter, ESA argued that the Icelandic Supreme Court showed reluctance to give effect to implemented 
EEA law in the cases of Commerzbank and Nederlandsche Bank. In ESA’s opinion, the Court could 
have ensured full effectiveness of EEA law if they had applied the Sole Article of Protocol 35 of the 
EEA Agreement and the principle of consistent interpretation. 
The Sole Article of Protocol 35 obliges judges of the national courts to ensure that domestic provisions 
in line with EEA law prevail over other provisions of domestic law. The rule was implemented in 
Article 2 of the Norwegian EEA Act and Article 3 of the Icelandic EEA Act.5 In an Icelandic 
assessment report from 1998 Article 3 is described as a rule of interpretation (skýringarreglan) that 
already follows from unwritten interpretation rules.6 The report brings to our attention that Article 3 
does not implement the full contents of Protocol 35, which this study also will show. In addition, the 
report explains that implementation of the full contents of Protocol 35 was not possible due to the 
Icelandic dualist approach.7  
My analysis will show similarities and differences in the Norwegian and Icelandic practice of 
consistent interpretation. I will suggest that the Icelandic version and practice of consistent 
interpretation is somehow problematic. I dedicate the supposed unwillingness of the Icelandic 
Supreme Court to ensure effectiveness of EEA law, to a somewhat confusing legal basis of the 
Icelandic rule of interpretation, as well as to the Icelandic practice of the dualist principle of letting 
domestic law prevail over international law and lack of a domestic provision ensuring primacy of 
implemented EEA law. 
1.2 Methodology 
This is an analytical study of Icelandic and Norwegian courts’ approaches when interpreting domestic 
and EEA law. The analysis contains a presentation of case law and elements of the analysis will be 
used to conduct a comparative study of the two countries’ legal tradition concerning EEA relevant 
cases. Some of the points made are drawn from few cases, this means that they cannot be treated as 
                                                
5 Act No 23/1992 Om gjennomføring i norsk rett av hoveddelen i avtale om Det europeiske økonomiske 
samarbeidsområde (Norwegian EEA Act) and Act No 2/1993 Um Evrópska efnahagssvæðið (Icelandic EEA 
Act). 
6 Gunnlaugsson, Kolbeinsson and Stefánsson 1998 p. 68. 
7 Gunnlaugsson, Kolbeinsson and Stefánsson 1998 p. 64-65 and 68. 
manifested rules, but in my opinion they are still relevant as they are important examples and represent 
a certain tendency in the judges’ practice. 
When isolating the rule of consistent interpretation in Icelandic and Norwegian legal tradition, the 
focus is on Supreme Court Decisions, as decisions of both countries’ Supreme Courts are given 
precedent status.8 To find out how the rule functions in practice, the scope should be broader and 
therefore, include rulings from lower courts and decisions of administrative authorities. To conduct 
such an analysis would be too demanding in a small study as this. This study is thus limited to 
Supreme Court cases, to give a normative description of the situation.  
It has been a challenge to find relevant Icelandic case law; legal literature and ESA documents have 
been helpful in this regard. Another challenge is the variety of details in the judges’ reasonings in 
published decisions. This makes it difficult to connect judgments with the principle of consistent 
interpretation. In addition to this, it is not always easy to isolate whether EEA law has been an 
influential factor in a specific case, because both Iceland and Norway incorporate EEA law in a way 
that makes it domestic law.  
1.3 Outline 
Before turning to the analysis of the situation in Iceland and Norway, there are some basic principles 
that need to be discussed. This is done in section 2 and 3, where the doctrine of dualism and the 
Courts’ loyalty to the Constitution is discussed. In section 4, a definition of the principle of consistent 
interpretation is presented, as well as presentations on how it is defined and practiced in the EU 
(section 4.2) and the EEA (section 4.3). The analysis of the Norwegian and Icelandic versions of the 
principle is presented in section 5. It starts by a presentation of the Norwegian experience (section 
5.1), before turning to the Icelandic experience (section 5.2). When presenting case law under the 
Icelandic experience (section 5.2.4), reference will be made to the Norwegian experience where 
relevant. A summary on the two countries’ experiences follows in section 6. 
                                                
8 This is a consequence of the Supreme Court being the last judicial instance, following Articles 88 and 90 of the 
Norwegian Constitution and Article 1 of Icelandic Act No 15/1998 Um dómstóla (Act on the courts). See also 
Andenæs 2009 p. 82-83, Lindal 1995 p. 65 and Nygaard 2004 p. 75.  
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2 The Dualist Approach 
When discussing how countries implement and apply international law, it is normal to divide them 
into dualist and monist traditions. A necessary consequence of a dualist approach, which is based on 
the concept of domestic and international law being two distinct legal orders,9 is that domestic law 
prevail over international law in case of conflict.10 The monist approach, on the other hand, follows a 
fundamental thinking of unity as provisions deriving from international law are considered part of the 
national legal system.11 Following this approach, international law usually prevails over domestic 
provisions in case of conflict.12 The transformation of international legislation into domestic law 
following the dualist doctrine, leads to a result where international provisions no longer are considered 
international law in the judges’ application of the legislation on domestic level.13 Both Iceland and 
Norway are considered to be dualist countries; if legislation is decided on international level and 
ratified, it also needs to pass through a legislative procedure of implementation to make it binding law. 
This approach has been taken into consideration in the EEA cooperation with Article 7 of the EEA 
Agreement.  
To divide countries into monist and dualist does not always give a true picture of how things really 
function, as the distinction between them is not always clear-cut.14 One could argue that many states 
practice a hybrid approach, with elements from both dualism and monism. An example is the strong 
tradition of treaty friendly interpretation in Iceland and Norway.15 A consequence of this is that the 
Courts allow influence of international law on the national legal system. By treaty friendly 
interpretation, the Court can correct possible wrongful implementation of EEA law. In result, this 
resembles the EU principle of direct effect,16 as in both situations one ends up with a result in 
conformity with EEA law. But although the result is similar, the method leading up to it is different.17  
One could argue that a too liberal application of treaty friendly interpretation could jeopardise a state’s 
belonging to the dualist doctrine and the elements on which it is based. This would be the case if the 
Court by this method would give unincorporated international legislation direct effect.18 In such a 
situation, the Court would contribute to water down the difference between dualism and monism. As 
pointed out by Ruud and Ulfstein, the Norwegian principle of presumption can lead to a relaxed 
                                                
9 Andenæs 2009 p. 58, Björgvinsson 2015 p. 31 and Ruud and Ulfstein 2011 p. 52. 
10 Andenæs 2009 p. 58, Arnesen and Stenvik 2015 p. 52 and Ruud and Ulfstein 2011 p. 56. 
11 Andenæs 2009 p. 58, Björgvinsson, 2015 p. 20, Ruud and Ulfstein 2011 p. 52 and Stefánsson 2000 p. 75. 
12 Björgvinsson 2015 p. 20 and Stefánsson 2000 p.75. 
13 Björgvinsson 2015 p. 33. 
14 Bull 2014 p. 203 and Ruud and Ulfstein, 2011 p. 53. 
15 Bull 2014 p. 211 and Franklin and Fredriksen 2015 p. 665. 
16 Franklin and Fredriksen 2015 p. 665 and Stefánsson 2000 p. 81. 
17 Franklin 2012 p. 298 and Stefánsson 2000 p. 81. 
18 Björgvinsson 2015 p. 112. 
relationship to the dualist tradition of transformation, where one no longer is obliged to rely on 
detailed transformed provisions.19 This suggests that through a strong tradition of treaty friendly 
interpretation one might end up reducing the need for direct incorporation and transformation of 
international provisions into domestic law.20 Which would make them right, those who argue that the 
impact of international legal systems on the nation states’ legal system drives dualist states towards 
monism.21  
Franklin and Fredriksen suggest that the Icelandic Supreme Court can «come across as a more 
principled defender of dualism and thus less willing to remedy deficient implementation of EEA 
obligations through dynamic interpretation of national law than its Norwegian counterpart».22 The 
analysis of the two countries’ case law in section 5 will hopefully show whether this is true. 
                                                
19 Ruud and Ulfstein 2011 p. 63. 
20 This is also suggested by Björgvinsson 2015 p. 109. 
21 See Hannesson 2011 p. 455-456. 
22 Franklin and Fredriksen 2015 p. 667. 
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3 The Courts’ Loyalty to the Constitution 
The rule on separation of powers is manifested in Article 2 of the Icelandic Constitution and Articles 
3, 49 and 88 of the Norwegian Constitution.23 According to this rule, national courts should be loyal to 
legislation passed and decisions made by the legislative power. This gives a main rule of letting 
domestic law passed by the legislature prevail if it were in conflict with non-implemented EEA law. In 
which degree the rule on the separation of powers is coherent with monism and dualism depends on 
the legislature’s involvement in the process of treaty making and ratification.24 
The principles of legality and legal predictability are also important following the two countries’ legal 
tradition.25 A rule that puts obligations on private parties should not be applied unless it has been made 
law by the legislature, otherwise this would conflict with the principle of legality. In addition to this, it 
is easier for a private party to predict its rights and obligations from written law. In this point of view 
one could argue that it would not be right towards individuals to let unimplemented international law 
determine their legal position. As pointed out by Björgvinsson: «individuals would normally be 
inclined to rely on domestic law».26 This last point pictures differently if you look at legal certainty 
from an EU/EEA perspective, as one can argue EU/EEA law as starting point to an individual’s 
legitimate expectations. In this aspect, the European Court of Justice (ECJ) and the EFTA Court might 
have a different standing point than national courts.27 
The elements discussed in this section follow from Icelandic and Norwegian constitutional 
requirements, and can thus be seen as constitutional obligations put on the national courts. They can 
also prove to be important in the courts’ arguments on whether to give EEA law effect or not, in 
situations where domestic law is not in apparent conformity with EEA legislation. By conducting 
consistent interpretation, the courts could in some cases end up bypassing the rule of separation of 
powers because the Court in such situations gives force to an international rule even though the 
legislature has not. The Court’s loyalty to the legislature can thus be an important limitation to 
consistent interpretation.28 Whether this is true would depend on how the courts practice the principle 
of consistent interpretation and if applying the principle appears to water down their loyalty to the 
Constitution. 
                                                
23 Act No 33/1944 Stjórnarskrá lýðveldsins Íslands (Icelandic Constitution), and Act of 17 May 1814 Kongeriket 
Norges Grunnlov (Norwegian Constitution). 
24 Björgvinsson 2015 p. 37. 
25 The principle of legality is manifested in Articles 94 and 96 of the Norwegian Constitution, and in Articles 69 
to 78 of the Icelandic Constitution. See also Andenæs and Fliflet 2006 p. 226 and 229, and Nygaard 2004 p. 60-
65 and 164.  
26 Björgvinsson 2015 p. 35. 
27 See for example ECJ Judgement in C-441/14 (Ajos) and the response of the Danish Supreme Court in Case No 
15/2014 delivered 6 December 2016. 
28 Björgvinsson 2015 p. 109, Nollkaemper 2011 p. 161 and 164. 
4 The Principle of Consistent Interpretation 
4.1 Definition and general remarks 
It follows from the principle of consistent interpretation that one must read domestic law in a way that 
does not conflict with international law, and this is true whether the international rule is incorporated 
into domestic law or not.29 In this way, national courts can ensure effectiveness and performance of 
international obligations.30 For a reasoning to qualify as consistent interpretation, the Court has to 
consider international law when interpreting and/or applying a domestic provision. In addition, this 
conclusion must be «consistent with both national and international law».31 The principle is thus not 
about letting international law prevail over domestic law, but about ensuring effectiveness of 
international obligations by interpreting domestic law in a way that conforms with international law. 
There are different driving forces behind application of the principle of consistent interpretation. As 
for EU and EEA relevant cases, the judicial power has a responsibility to ensure that the state complies 
with agreed upon obligations.32 
Even though it may lead to similar results, the principle of consistent interpretation must not be 
confused with the principle of direct effect. However, one could argue that consistent interpretation in 
some situations functions as a substitute for direct effect where this cannot be achieved.33 It is clear 
that the principle of consistency indeed is a valuable instrument to give international law effect on a 
domestic level, and that it can act as a substitute for incorporation.34 But, this must be done within 
limitations of the principle: the courts must respect the fundamental principles discussed in section 3; 
and they are bound by the wording of national provisions.35 
4.2 EU principle of consistent interpretation 
At EU level, the principle of consistent interpretation is a principle on how national courts should read 
domestic legislation where it apparently is not in conformity with EU law. The European Court of 
Justice has set precedent for situations, through several judgements, where consistent interpretation is 
                                                
29 Björgvinsson 2015 p. 104-105. 
30 Nollkaemper 2011 p. 139. 
31 Nollkaemper 2011 p. 140. 
32 This follows from Article 4 fourth paragraph TEU and Article 3 EEA. See also Hannesson 2012 p. 242-243, 
Hreinsson 2016 p. 354 and 376-377, Nollkaemper 2011 p. 147-149 and Sejersted et al. 2011 p. 206. 
33 Björgvinsson 2015 p. 105, Nollkaemper 2011 p. 140-141 and Stefánsson 2000 p. 81. 
34 Björgvinsson 2015 p. 109 and Ruud and Ulfstein 2011 p. 63. 
35 Björgvinsson 2015 p. 109-111. 
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demanded of the national courts.36 As put down by the ECJ in Dominguez, it is expected of national 
courts to interpret domestic law «so far as possible» to achieve a result consistent with the objectives 
of the directive, as long as the judges keep within the wording of the national provision and purpose of 
the directive concerned.37 In Marleasing, the ECJ referred the obligation of consistent interpretation to 
Article 5 of the Treaty38 which stated that the Member States should «take all appropriate measures 
(…) to ensure the fulfilment of» the obligation following a directive to achieve its desired results.39 
The objective is to interpret domestic provisions in line with goals of the specific EU legislation in 
question.40 This objective also puts obligations on the national courts of the Member States, and their 
methods of interpretation, as they are to ensure full effectiveness of EU provisions.41 
As for the principle’s limitations, the ECJ has made it clear that one cannot apply this method of 
interpretation in a way that contradicts domestic law (contra legem).42 Thus, the courts must keep 
within the wording of the law, and interpret the domestic provisions so far as possible in line with EU 
law.43 It is also clear that the principle, in the ECJ’s opinion, obliges national courts to leave precedent 
case law where necessary.44 As a tool in its application of the principle, the ECJ has made it clear that 
national courts should take the whole body of law into consideration.45  
As mentioned in section 4.1, the principles of legality and legal predictability are seen as limitations to 
conducting consistent interpretation. Following the recent judgement in Ajos, this must be elaborated 
in an EU perspective, as the ECJ in this case puts emphasis on individuals’ legal predictability 
following EU legislation. The Danish Supreme Court had asked the ECJ how to balance the general 
EU principle prohibiting discrimination with the principles of legal certainty and protection of 
legitimate expectations in cases with two private parties. The European Court of Justice concluded that 
the mentioned principles could not alter the obligation of national courts to conduct EU consistent 
interpretations and refrain from applying national provisions that were inconsistent with the general 
principle prohibiting discrimination. 
Under EU law, some legislation is given direct effect, e.g. that it can be applied in Member States in 
the absence of implementation into domestic law, this follows from Article 288 TFEU and ECJ case 
                                                
36 The obligation to interpret national law in conformity with EU law was manifested in 14/83 (Von Colson) and 
later in C-106/89 (Marleasing). See also later judgments: C-441/14 (Ajos); C-282/10 (Dominguez); C-397/01 
(Pfeiffer) and C-91/92 (Dori). 
37 Dominguez paragraph 24. 
38 Today Article 4 fourth paragraph TEU. 
39 Marleasing paragraph 8. 
40 Dominguez paragraph 24. 
41 Ajos paragraphs 29 and 30. 
42 Ajos paragraph 32 and Dominguez paragraph 25. 
43 Ajos paragraph 31 and Dominguez paragraph 24. 
44 Ajos paragraphs 33 and 34. 
45 Ajos paragraph 31 and Dominguez paragraphs 26-31. 
law.46 The use of direct effect is often limited which can make the principle of consistent interpretation 
a convenient method to arrive at EU conform conclusions.47 Franklin and Fredriksen argue that the 
ECJ not always manages to keep a clear distinction between consistent interpretation, direct effect and 
primacy.48 It is true that they can be difficult to distinguish from one another as they all strive to reach 
an EU conform result. Even though this is the case, the principle of consistent interpretation appears to 
be an alternative procedure in cases which do not fall into the scope of direct effect. 
4.3 EEA perspective on consistent interpretation 
According to the EFTA Court, it follows from the EEA Agreement that national courts have a duty to 
interpret domestic legislation in line with EEA law.49 In Criminal proceedings against A, the Court 
stated that the agreement obliges national courts «to interpret national law (…) as far as possible in 
conformity with EEA law».50 The EFTA Court has thus established that the principle of consistent 
interpretation also applies to the EEA countries of Iceland, Liechtenstein and Norway. 
By obliging national courts to practice consistent interpretation, the courts contribute to ensure 
effectiveness of EEA law as well as acting in line with the objective of uniformity.51 However, 
national courts must step carefully, as no transfer of legislative power, and no principle of direct effect 
follow from the EEA Agreement.52 In this regard, the EFTA Court has emphasised that there is no 
requirement of direct applicability under the EEA Agreement in situations where the legislature has 
failed to transpose relevant EEA law correctly into domestic law.53 This is an example of how the 
EFTA Court, differently from the ECJ, makes and upholds a distinction between the principles of 
consistent interpretation, direct effect and primacy of EEA law.54 
The EFTA Court has stated that rules which are liable to jeopardise the achievement of objectives 
pursued by EEA directives may not be applied, as that would deprive EEA law of its effectiveness.55 
The Court also wants national courts to apply interpretive methods recognised by national law in order 
                                                
46 Case 26/62 (Van Gend en Loos) pages 12-13. 
47 As also emphasized by among other Björgvinsson 2015 p. 105, Franklin 2012 p. 298, Nollkaemper 2011 p. 
140-141 and Stefánsson 2000 p. 81. 
48 Franklin and Fredriksen 2015 p. 668. 
49 E-4/01 (Karlsson) paragraph 28. See also Arnesen and Stenvik 2015 p. 65, Björgvinsson 2006 p. 139, 
Fredriksen and Mathisen 2014 p. 288 and Hreinsson 2016 p. 354. 
50 E-1/07 paragraph 39. 
51 Björgvinsson 2006 p. 97, Hannesson 2012 p. 242-243, Hreinsson 2016 p. 377 and Sejersted et al. 2011 p. 206. 
52 E-1/07 paragraph 40. 
53 E-18/11 (Irish Bank) paragraph 126. 
54 Franklin and Fredriksen have argued this distinction made by the EFTA Court: Franklin and Fredriksen 2015 
p. 668. 
55 E-15/12 (Wahl) paragraph 54, E-12/13 (ESA v. Iceland) paragraph 73 and Joined Cases E-15 and 16/15 
(Hagedorn) paragraph 96. 
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to achieve EEA conformity of a domestic provision.56 Like in the ECJ cases, the EFTA Court urges an 
interpretation that ensures results sought by EEA legislation.57 As also encouraged by the ECJ, the 
EFTA Court has stated that national courts must take the whole body of law into consideration when 
interpreting domestic provisions, as well as all relevant EEA law whether implemented or not.58 The 
Court has also emphasised that in doing this, national courts cannot only rely on their language version 
of a translated EEA provision as sole basis, as they consider such an approach to be «incompatible 
with the principle of homogeneity and the [obligation of] uniform application of EEA law».59 As 
specified by the EFTA Court in Hagedorn, obligations following EEA legislation «arise on the day the 
respective legal act is made part of the EEA Agreement»,60 and domestic law must therefore be 
interpreted in accordance with them from that point on, not only from the moment they are 
incorporated into domestic legislation. 
When national courts are to decide on the applicability of EEA legislation, it is of relevance which 
subjects it refers to, and if it contains positive rights or negative obligations. The EFTA Court has 
manifested that private parties can rely rights on implemented provisions of the EEA Agreement if 
they are unconditional and sufficiently precise.61 If the rules commit the state and the judicial power, it 
means that private subjects may apply this rule without having to wait for the legislative power to 
implement it at national level.62 This is where it is important to make a distinction between horizontal 
and vertical cases. A horizontal case concerns competing rights between private parties, whereas a 
vertical case is between a private party and the state. According to the principles discussed in section 
3, a rule must be implemented in domestic law to be applicable in a horizontal case. As the state 
already has agreed to the rule, even before it is transformed into domestic law, obligations following 
the international rule can be put on the state even before the legislature has implemented the rule. This 
is why the principle of state liability ends up as an alternative solution where it is not possible to 
achieve an EEA conform result by consistent interpretation.63 
                                                
56 E-1/07 paragraph 39, ESA v. Iceland paragraph 73, Wahl paragraph 54, E-28/13 (Merill Lynch) paragraph 44 
and E-25/13 (Engilbertsson) paragraphs 159 and 163. 
57 E-1/07 paragraph 39, Irish Bank paragraphs 123 and 126 and Merill Lynch paragraph 43. 
58 Irish Bank paragraph 124, E-12/13 paragraph 74, Wahl paragraph 55, Merill Lynch paragraph 43, 
Engilbertsson paragraph 163 and Hagedorn paragraph 97. 
59 Irish Bank paragraph 88. 
60 Hagedorn paragraph 97. 
61 E-1/94 (Restamark) paragraph 77 and 80, Karlsson paragraph 37 and E-2/12 (HOB Vín) paragraph 122. 
62 Arnesen and Stenvik 2015 p. 53. 
63 The principle of state liability was manifested in E-9/97 (Sveinbjörnsdóttir).  
5 The Principle of Consistent Interpretation 
in the National Courts of Iceland and Norway 
5.1 The Norwegian Experience 
5.1.1 Introduction 
To interpret domestic law in line with implemented international law, e.g. the principle of 
presumption, is an established interpretation rule in Norwegian legal methodology.64 Earlier case law 
from the Norwegian Supreme Court shows that judges have applied the principle of presumption to 
make Norwegian law in line with law following the European Charter of Human Rights (ECHR) and 
Conventions on International Labour Organization (ILO).65 Due to Norway’s obligations following the 
EEA cooperation, the principle should also be applied in EEA relevant cases.66 The main case to show 
how to apply the principle of presumption on EEA law is Finanger I,67 which is discussed below. 
Further, this part of the paper will look at other case law that can contribute to describe how the 
principle is practiced in Norwegian courts. Before turning to case law, this part starts with a 
presentation of the Norwegian principle of presumption and the Norwegian EEA Act. 
5.1.2 The principle of presumption 
Following the principle of presumption, domestic provisions shall be interpreted so far as possible in 
line with Norway’s international obligations.68 Here it is presumed that the international rule is well 
known and the courts should identify the international rule before applying it when reading domestic 
provisions.69 To arrive at a result in line with Norway’s international obligations, the judges have to 
use other tools and methods of interpretation, such as lex specialis and lex posterior.70 Case law shows 
that the courts also make use of travaux préparatoires in this regard;71 to find out whether the 
legislature meant for domestic provisions to breach international obligations. This is in line with the 
courts’ loyalty to the Constitution. The principle of presumption will not be applied if the conflict 
                                                
64 Arnesen and Stenvik 2015 p. 64 and Nygaard 2004 p. 146. 
65 Rt. 1997 p. 580 and Rt. 1997 p. 1019. 
66 Rt. 2000 p. 1811 (Finanger I) p. 1826, Ot.prp. No 79 1991-92 p. 4 and Arnesen and Stenvik 2015 p. 64. 
67 Rt. 2000 p. 1811. 
68 Finanger I p. 1826, St.prp. No 100 1991-92 p. 319 and Arnesen and Stenvik 2015 p. 64. 
69 Arnesen and Stenvik 2015 p. 64. 
70 St.prp. No 100 1991-92 p. 319. 
71 Finanger I p. 1827. 
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between the domestic provision and international obligations is so clear that an interpretation in line 
with the international obligation is not possible, then the Norwegian provision will prevail.72  
5.1.3 The Norwegian EEA Act 
According to Article 1 of the Norwegian EEA Act, the main part of the EEA Agreement is given 
status as Norwegian law. Further, in Article 2, the courts are given instructions on how to act if two 
domestic provisions are in conflict: the one in line with EEA law shall prevail. This is in line with the 
Sole Article of Protocol 35 of the EEA Agreement, which aim is to help achieve a homogeneous EEA 
without requiring the states «to transfer legislative powers to any institution of the [EEA]».73 Protocol 
35 cannot be described as a clear primacy rule as it only is effective in situations where EEA 
legislation already is correctly implemented in domestic law and as it does not ensure that EEA 
friendly regulation prevail over provisions of the Constitution.74 In addition, the rule does not prevent 
later legislation from setting it aside. Moreover, the Protocol expects national courts to achieve this 
quasi primacy by «national procedures»,75 which means that the rule does not necessary prevent later 
enacted statutory provisions from prevailing even though they are inconsistent with earlier enacted 
EEA friendly provisions in line with the collision rule of lex posterior.  
National courts have full jurisdiction to treat cases where EEA law is relevant, and implemented EEA 
legislation is considered national law in accordance with the dualist approach. This is also the case 
where it seems like the legislative power has failed to implement EEA law (correctly). In the travaux 
préparatoires to the EEA Act and the EEA Agreement, the legislature contributes with some guidance 
on how the courts should deal with these types of cases. Mentioning the principle of presumption, it is 
stated that the courts are expected to make use of all tools and known principles of interpretation to 
make sure they do not conclude in a way that would be in conflict with international obligations.76 
Different principles and methods of interpretation are mentioned, as well as a rule that states that only 
law specifically said to be applied a certain way by the legislature can set other provisions aside.77 It is 
emphasised that only implemented law can be given legal effect, and that this means that there is no 
direct effect under the EEA Agreement,78 which is in line with Article 7 of the Agreement.  
                                                
72 Franklin 2012 p. 270, Ruud and Ulfstein 2011 p. 63-64 and Sejersted et al. 2011 p. 265-267. 
73 Preamble to Protocol 35 to the EEA Agreement. 
74 Bull 2014 p. 207, Franklin and Fredriksen 2015 p. 662, Fredriksen and Mathisen 2014 p. 299, Hreinsson 2016 
p. 383 and Sejersted et al. 2011 p. 204.   
75 Preamble to Protocol 35. 
76 St.prp. No 100 1991-92 p. 319. 
77 Ot.prp. No 79 1991-92 p. 4. 
78 St.prp. No 100 1991-92 p. 318. 
The rules here mentioned, give Norwegian courts guidelines on how to act when dealing with EEA 
cases where the domestic legislation is not in apparent conformity with EEA law. In which way the 
courts do practice the rules remains to be seen in the following sections on Norwegian case law. 
5.1.4 Finanger I 
At the age of 17, Miss Finanger was badly injured in a car crash and because she knew that the driver 
was intoxicated by alcohol, she was refused an insurance payment in line with Article 7 third 
paragraph letter b of the Norwegian Automobile Liability Act.79 Article 7 was an exception to the 
main provision in Article 4, which stated that an injured person could claim insurance from the 
insurance company of the vehicle he or she was injured in/by. Miss Finanger’s lawyer argued that 
Article 7 breached EEA law,80 which was also the opinion of the EFTA Court.81 The majority of the 
Supreme Court (ten judges) concluded that the domestic provision could not be set aside due to the 
EEA Directives and ended up applying Article 7 to limit Miss Finanger’s insurance payment. Five 
judges dissented on the decision not to interpret Norwegian law in line with EEA legislation.  
The representative of the Court’s majority presented a thorough reasoning on how EEA law can be 
used as a tool of interpretation. After having concluded the meaning of the domestic provision and its 
conflict with EEA law, the judge discussed the EEA Directives’ impact on the interpretation of it. It 
was stated that non-implemented EEA law cannot prevail over national law,82 e.g. be given direct 
effect, but that it can be useful when interpreting Norwegian law in line with the principle of 
presumption.83 Turning to the EU principle of consistent interpretation, the judge stated that it could 
not be stretched as far as to allow EU law prevail where there is a clear conflict. It was also stated that 
this has to be the situation when the legislature has assumed a correct implementation of EU law,84 as 
was the situation in this case.85 The majority of the Court did not let overall views of travaux 
préparatoires set aside the clear wording of Article 7. This shows that even though travaux 
préparatoires are an important tool in interpreting legal texts, it is only an element, and cannot be too 
heavily weighted.  
In the majority’s reasoning, it is stated that the use of the principle of presumption depends on the 
international commitment and which area of law the domestic provision applies to.86 Elaborating on 
this, it is stated that a national provision will show little resistance against an international rule which 
                                                
79 Act of 3 February 1961 Om ansvar for skade som motorvogner gjer (Automobile Liability Act) 
80 Directives on Motor Vehicle Insurance: 72/166/EEC; 84/5/EEC; and 90/232/EEC. 
81 E-1/99. 
82 Finanger I p. 1826. 
83 Ibid. 
84 Ibid. p. 1829. 
85 Ibid. p. 1827. 
86 Ibid. p. 1829. 
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provides individuals protection from the state, but greater resistance if the case concerns private 
parties on both sides.87 According to this reasoning, the principle of presumption has weaker impact in 
horizontal cases.88 This is in line with the intent of not transferring too much state supremacy to EEA 
institutions.89 To make a difference between vertical and horizontal cases is in line with the principle 
of legal predictability, as the state is already aware of its obligations when it agrees on the legislation 
at international level. This differentiation makes a rule that in horizontal cases more is demanded of 
the domestic rule when it comes to lack of precision and clarity to be able to interpret it in line with 
EEA law. 
In the Court’s reasoning, emphasis was put on the principle of legal predictability.90 When the wording 
of a domestic provision is clear, private parties must be able to rely on both the obligations put on 
them and the rights they are entitled according to the specific provision. From this, it is possible to 
conclude that according to the Supreme Court, one cannot expect private parties to be fully updated on 
all rules that should apply to them according to Norway’s international obligations. Another situation 
would give uncertainty of which legislation one could rely on, and that could be unfortunate for both 
professional parties as well as private citizens. This thus makes the principle of legal predictability an 
important element in the argument of how domestic provisions should be interpreted. 
Even though the principle of presumption did not lead to an EEA conform conclusion, this case can be 
considered a manifestation of the principle to be applied where suitable. It was the limitations 
represented by a clear provision that prevented an EEA conform result, and the Court emphasized that 
it is up to the legislature to make domestic law in line with EEA obligations.91 From this, it is easy to 
agree with Björgvinsson who argues that the judgement «reaffirms the principle of dualism and the 
doctrine of transformation, as well as the principle of primacy of national law over unincorporated 
international law».92  
Franklin, on the other side, is critical to the Court’s reasoning and its understanding of the EU 
principle of consistent interpretation.93 In his opinion, this misunderstanding can be a result of there 
being few ECJ cases where the limits and obligations under the EU principle are outlined at the time 
of the Finanger I judgement. It is true that ECJ case law has contributed to a different understanding 
of EU consistent interpretation after Finanger I. This makes it important to look at later Norwegian 
case law when outlining the Norwegian experience with EEA conform interpretation. 
                                                
87 Ibid. 
88 Ibid. p. 1832. 
89 In line with Protocol 35. 
90 Finanger I p. 1831. 
91 The legislature had actually changed the domestic legislation in question, to make it in line with EEA law, 
before the case was debated in the Supreme Court. 
92 Björgvinsson 2015 p. 111. 
93 Franklin 2012 p. 272-273. 
Another element that must be devoted some attention is the Court’s lack of taking into consideration 
other domestic legislation. As suggested by Franklin,94 the Court could have applied the main rule in 
Article 4 instead of applying the exception in Article 7 to ensure EEA conformity. This would be in 
line with the EU/EEA criteria of taking the whole body of law into consideration when conducting 
consistent interpretation. From the case of Finanger I, it seems that this criterion is not present in the 
Norwegian experience with consistent interpretation. Or at least, that it is undermined by the collision 
rule of lex specialis. 
5.1.5 Other case law 
Finanger I is an example of a detailed reasoning on the principle of presumption applied in an EEA 
relevant case. By 2016, there are a few other examples where the Supreme Court has applied the 
principle of consistent interpretation in interpreting law that appears not to be in conformity with EEA 
law.95 
In Norwegian Dental Depot,96 the Court decided to set aside rules developed in earlier case law due to 
legislation following an EEA Directive.97 This was done to make the decision in line with EEA 
obligations. The judge argued that a rule developed in earlier case law, on attributing strict liability to 
similar types of cases, breached the specific directive and could therefore not be applied.98 Even 
though precedent from earlier case law is considered part of domestic law, these types of rules are not 
binding in the same way as written law, and the Supreme Court may disregard them if they find it 
necessary.99 This makes it less dramatic for the Supreme Court to go in a new direction. If the same 
law that had been practiced earlier came from a clear and precise written legal text, it would be more 
likely for the Court to end up with the same result as in Finanger I. 
In another case, Hydro Aluminium,100 the Court had to decide on the base for a time limit for 
demanding reimbursement of illegal state aid. The Court presented different alternatives as to what 
should be the starting point for when the state could demand reimbursement and landed on a 
conclusion that was in line with EEA law.101 This was a case of an ambiguous wording of domestic 
law which was open to interpretation. The arguments leading to the conclusion entailed a variety of 
                                                
94 Franklin 2012 p. 303. 
95 To find relevant cases I have done a web search on lovdata.no, searching for “presumsjonsprinsippet” and 
“direktivkonform fortolkning”. Some of the cases are also found in legal literature: Fredriksen 2011 p. 70-73; 
and Fredriksen and Mathisen 2014 p. 292.   
96 Rt. 2004 p. 122. 
97 Council Directive 85/374/EEC on Product Liability. 
98 Norwegian Dental Depot paragraph 31. 
99 Andenæs 2009 p. 87-90 and Nygaard 2004 p. 329-330. 
100 Rt. 2013 p. 1665. 
101 Protocol 3 part II Article 14 No 3 in the EEA Surveillance and Court Agreement (SCA). Referred in 
paragraph 50 of the judgment. 
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applying other domestic provisions, earlier case law, travaux préparatoires, and EEA obligations, to 
interpret the specific provision in conformity with EEA obligations.  
A number of cases deal with trademark legislation.102 Four of the cases are examples where wording 
of the domestic provision needed further explanation and the judges applied EU law to outline or 
confirm the meaning of the wording or legal criteria. The case of Vesta was different in the way that 
the Court based a narrow interpretation of the domestic provision103 on ECJ practice. This 
interpretation was not in line with the immediate natural understanding of the wording of the 
provision. This was done to make the decision in line with EEA obligations and an implemented 
directive.104 In this case, the Court also deviated from earlier Supreme Court understanding of the 
provision.105 The case does not represent an example of setting aside domestic written law; it is an 
example of how the judges apply EEA law in the interpretation of domestic provisions to make sure 
they coincide. If there had been a more precise and clear wording in the Norwegian legal text, which 
did not coincide with the rules of the Directive, the result might have been different. 
There are also a few cases that concern transfer of enterprise and the question of which obligations the 
new business has towards the employees of the previous business.106 In all four cases, the Court 
interprets domestic legal criteria in line with EEA obligations. This seems unproblematic as the 
wording of the domestic legislation needed further explanation. The same goes for the case of 
Fjellkraft AS,107 which concerned demerging of a company. In this case, the Court conducted a wide 
interpretation of a domestic provision and based it on EU legislation.108 
5.1.6 Concluding remarks on the Norwegian experience 
The Norwegian experience shows that in cases where the domestic provision in question appears not 
to be in line with EEA obligations, Norwegian judges are left with traditional rules of interpretation to 
decide the outcome of the case. In these types of cases the principle of presumption as well as the 
principles of efficiency and loyalty to the legislature are important elements. Through different 
methods of interpretation of law, the Court makes sure that Norway’s international obligations are not 
breached, which can prevent cases of state liability against Norway. In this way, the Court contributes 
                                                
102 Rt. 2002 p. 391 (God Morgen), Rt. 2004 p. 1474 (Volvo), Rt. 2006 p. 1473 (Vesta), Rt. 2008 p. 1268 
(Søtt+Salt) and HR-2016-1993-A (Pangea AS). 
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Mark Act). 
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to enhance the principle of efficiency, which says domestic law should be interpreted in a way that 
ensures effectiveness of international obligations.109 
Case law shows that the Supreme Court tends to interpret domestic legislation in accordance with 
EEA law. When it comes to the case of Finanger I, another result might have made the line between 
the Court’s role as a law interpreter and as a lawmaker unclear. Therefore, this could compromise the 
Court’s loyalty to the Constitution. As emphasised by the majority vote, this would not be the same if 
the case concerned a private party versus the state. If international law puts the private party in a better 
position vis-à-vis the state, the rule of consistent interpretation should be applied.110 In these cases the 
principles of legality and legal predictability do not prevent EEA conform conclusions because they 
are not applicable in the state’s defence.111 Another outcome could result in states’ profiting from not 
implementing EEA law (correctly). 
Norwegian case law shows that judges, in their reasoning, do think of principles such as loyalty to the 
legislature and legal predictability. It also shows that they tend to practice a line of argument that 
respects the objective of uniform interpretation and effectiveness of EEA law. Another tendency is 
that the quality of domestic legislation is of relevance, in terms of value of legal sources and clear and 
precise wording. It was easier for the Court to deviate from domestic law that followed from legal 
precedent in Norwegian Dental Depot, than it was in Finanger I, where there was a clear and precise 
written rule.  
Fredriksen suggests that from previous case law one can conclude, «that the Supreme Court will 
disregard even clear assumptions in the travaux préparatoires and overrule its own precedents if 
deemed necessary in order to interpret Norwegian law in conformity with underlying EEA 
obligations».112 Similar remarks were made by Fredriksen and Franklin, when they argue that Supreme 
Court case law show that the judges are ready «to go beyond» what they consider to be the natural 
understanding of a provision.113 In my opinion, this is a result of the quality and value the judges 
entitle different legal sources. This method is in accordance with the overriding objective of 
effectiveness and the obligations put on the national courts to achieve it, in accordance with the 
Norwegian EEA Act and the EEA Agreement.  
From the experience of Finanger I, I drew the conclusion that under the Norwegian practice of 
consistent interpretation one does not take the whole body of law into consideration to ensure an EEA 
conform result. Later case law suggests a change in practice. Two examples are the cases of Hydro 
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Aluminium and Pangea AS, which show that the Supreme Court actively applies other relevant law 
and end up with an EEA conform result. It is difficult to draw a conclusion from this, as the later case 
law does not show a similar conflict as the one in Finanger I and as the later cases did not concern an 
unambiguous provision. From this I will conclude that the so far as possible rule within the principle 
of presumption meets its limit in an unambiguous wording of written law as well as in other traditional 
rules of interpretation such as lex specialis, lex posterior and lex superior. 
5.2 The Icelandic Experience 
5.2.1 Introduction 
As in Norway, the main part of the EEA Agreement is implemented in Icelandic law.114 Even though 
there may be many other similarities, the focus of this study is on how the Supreme Court gives effect 
to EEA law. This is demonstrated by the existence and practice of the principle of consistent 
interpretation, and therefore, the Icelandic rule of interpretation (skýringarreglan) is a good place to 
start. It is clear from Icelandic case law, travaux préparatoires and legal theory that the interpretation 
rule in Article 3 of the Icelandic EEA Act is highly relevant regarding the rule of interpretation; this 
will therefore be discussed in section 5.2.3. Then, in section 5.2.4, the paper turns to look at case law 
with the intention to outline the rules that follow from the Icelandic experience with consistent 
interpretation, and draw a line to similarities and differences with the Norwegian experience. The 
objective is to point out how the interpretation rule is practiced in Iceland, and whether this is different 
from the Norwegian experience with the principle of presumption.  
5.2.2 The rule of interpretation – skýringarreglan 
According to Icelandic legal tradition, judges should interpret domestic law in line with Iceland’s 
international obligations to the extent possible.115 This is called the rule of interpretation, 
skýringarreglan, and it is understood as an obligation put on judges to conduct such interpretation.116 
Previous judgements show that in case of collision between different provisions, where one follows 
from international obligations and the other derives from purely national legislative procedures, the 
domestic provision shall be interpreted in line with international law so far as possible.117 The so far as 
possible wording is the same as in the Norwegian experience with the principle of presumption, but 
                                                
114 Article 2 first paragraph of the Icelandic EEA Act. 
115 1. Frumvarp til laga 1992 p. 194, Björgvinsson 2015 p. 116, Björgvinsson 2006 p. 129 and 175, Hannesson 
2011 p. 430 and Stefánsson 2000 p. 81. 
116 Hannesson 2011 p. 430 and Hreinsson 2014 p. 290. 
117 1. Frumvarp til laga 1992 p. 194. 
though the wording is similar, the practice of the rule may vary. This will be discussed further in the 
section on case law. 
From explanatory notes to the EEA Act, one can read that the Icelandic Supreme Court previously has 
gone far to interpret domestic law in line with Iceland’s international obligations.118 In addition, 
Björgvinsson states that there are many examples of cases where Icelandic judges have applied the 
principle of consistent interpretation.119 As an example, in Criminal proceedings against Ægisson,120 
the Supreme Court concluded differently from similar previous cases in order to land on a result in 
line with ECHR legislation.121 The case concerned wrongful criminal proceeding, as the same person 
who gave judgement before the Criminal Court also worked for the police. In another judgement,122 
which concerned rights deriving from ECHR ensuring a blind girl’s right to equal opportunity in 
regards to education, the Supreme Court described the principle of consistent interpretation as a 
recognized one in Nordic legal tradition.123  
Together with previous case law, the explanatory notes confirm the existence of a rule of 
interpretation. Hence, is it possible to conclude that according to Icelandic legal tradition there is a rule 
of interpretation, which resembles the EU/EEA principle of consistent interpretation. The Icelandic 
rule does seemingly follow from an unwritten principle of conducting legal interpretation, as is also 
the case with the similar principle of presumption practiced in Norway. 
After establishing the existence of the Icelandic rule of interpretation, then comes the question of how 
this rule fits into the Icelandic legal tradition concerning EEA law. The explanatory notes give a point 
of direction to Article 3 of the EEA Act, so that will be the next step on the way to understanding the 
Icelandic version and practice of the principle of consistent interpretation in EEA relevant cases. 
5.2.3 Article 3 of the Icelandic EEA Act – is it an implementation of 
Protocol 35? 
In Icelandic case law, legal theory and in comments from ESA, it is possible to find arguments stating 
that the Icelandic EEA Act contains an incomplete implementation of the Sole Article of Protocol 
35.124 According to Icelandic case law and explanatory notes to the Icelandic EEA Act, Article 3 of the 
Act meant to implement the rule.125 Article 3 states that «[s]tatutes and regulations shall be interpreted, 
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119 Björgvinsson 2015 p. 113. 
120 Hrd. 1990 bls. 2 (Hrd. 9 January 1990 (120/1989)). 
121 1. Frumvarp til laga 1992 p. 194. 
122 Hrd. 4 February 1999 (177/1998). 
123 Section I of the Judgment. See also Björgvinsson 2015 p. 116. 
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in so far as appropriate, to accord with the EEA Agreement and the rules based thereon».126 A literal 
understanding gives a rule that all Icelandic law should at all time, if possible, be interpreted in line 
with the Agreement and domestic law that follows from the EEA cooperation. Different from Protocol 
35, Article 3 is not limited to implemented EEA legislation.127 This understanding is similar to the 
interpretation rule discussed in the previous section. Following this, one could argue that Article 3 is a 
codification of the rule of interpretation in Icelandic law, only specifically directed to EEA relevant 
cases. 
The Icelandic Supreme Court explained its interpretation of Article 3 in Einarsson.128 Mr Einarsson 
claimed that the State breached Article 14 of the EEA Agreement by demanding higher taxes on books 
in foreign languages (24.5 %) than for Icelandic books (14 %). The Court referred to the explanatory 
notes previously mentioned and interpreted Article 14 of the EEA Agreement to be lex specialis that 
should prevail over the older tax rules in question. The reasoning of the Supreme Court is not very 
elaborate, but it refers to the reasoning of the District Court of Reykjavik. In the District Court 
judgment, it was emphasized that the rule in Protocol 35 only deals with national rules that are meant 
to implement EEA law,129 and the judge referred to the EFTA Court’s understanding of Protocol 35 in 
Restamark.130 In accordance with this understanding of Article 3, it is a rule that allows implemented 
EEA law to prevail over other domestic law, in line with the wording of the Sole Article of Protocol 
35. From this judgement, one could argue that the Court does not treat Article 3 as a codification of 
the rule of interpretation, but rather as a codification of Protocol 35.  
The explanatory notes explain Article 3 as a rule that provides implemented EEA law status of lex 
specialis.131 Similar remarks to the principle of presumption exists in the Norwegian travaux 
préparatoires to the EEA Agreement; that national rules of interpretation such as lex specialis and lex 
posterior are important tools of interpretation.132 Hreinsson suggests that the Supreme Court 
judgement in Einarsson shows that Article 3 is indeed an implementation of Protocol 35.133 
Guðmundsdóttir seems to agree, when she interprets Article 3 as a rule of letting domestic law in line 
with EEA law prevail over other domestic law.134 She argues that the interpretation rule 
(skýringarreglan) goes further than the one referred to in the explanatory notes.135   
                                                
126 Icelandic EEA Act Article 3: «Skýra skal lög og reglur, að svo miklu leyti sem við á, til samræmis við EES-
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At first glance, Article 3 seems like an implementation in Icelandic law of the principle of consistent 
interpretation. But from the case of Einarsson and explanatory notes in the travaux préparatoires, it 
appears that the interpretation of the rule in Article 3 is closer to the Norwegian implementation of 
Protocol 35 in Article 2 of the Norwegian EEA Act. 
The Supreme Court has treated the contents of the rule in Article 3 in many cases. They all describe 
the rule as an obligation for the judges to stick to the wording of written law, and within the limits of 
the wording interpret domestic law in line with EEA law.136 From this, one could argue an 
understanding of Article 3 as a codification of the rule of interpretation.  
The case of Candy Spray137 is a good example of the Icelandic Supreme Court considering the rule of 
interpretation as it is manifested in Article 3 of the Icelandic EEA Act. The case concerned a vendor’s 
and an importer’s liability for damages caused by candy they sold and/or imported and the Court 
concluded that the companies had to pay the injured party compensation for the damages. Concerning 
possibilities to interpret domestic provisions in line with non-implemented EEA rules, the Court 
referred to Article 3. The Court explained that according to this rule of interpretation, one should, if 
possible, interpret the wording of domestic law to be in line with rules that apply in the EEA. The 
Article is thus not treated as a rule that gives implemented EEA legislation primacy over other 
domestic provisions. In this case, the Court seems ready to interpret the wording of domestic law in 
line with non-implemented EEA law, but it was not possible because of clear and precise wording of 
domestic provisions.  
The Supreme Court repeated the understanding of Article 3 from Candy Spray in Flugastraumur and 
Gunnarsson.138 Moreover, in Flugastraumur, the plaintiff had specifically questioned whether Article 
3 is a sufficient implementation of Protocol 35, but the Court refrained from answering this 
question.139 The case concerned financial leasing and whether the Supreme Court should agree to a 
request to ask the EFTA Court for a reasoned opinion, which they did not. 
Later case law suggest that Article 3 has not successfully incorporated the rule in Protocol 35, of 
letting EEA friendly domestic provisions prevail over other domestic provisions. It thus excludes a 
primacy effect following Article 3 of the Icelandic EEA Act. This understanding was supported by an 
                                                
136 This sentence is referred to in several cases. See for example Hrd. 18 August 2014 (527/2014) Wow Air I 
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Icelandic assessment report on EEA law in 1998.140 It means that under Icelandic law there is no 
obligation to let EEA friendly domestic provisions prevail over other domestic law if there were to be 
conflict between them. Such a conclusion would mean that the contents of the implementation of 
Protocol 35 in Icelandic and Norwegian law differ.141  
Following this, I will argue that it can become a problem that implemented EEA law is not given 
primacy in situations where the interpretation rule does not ensure an EEA conform result.142 
Hannesson is quite critical of Article 3; he claims that the Article does not give Icelandic courts 
authority to set aside domestic provisions in benefit of EEA conform domestic provisions,143 as is also 
the opinion of ESA.144 In Hannesson’s opinion, the legislature grants the courts the power that 
Protocol 35 calls for in the travaux préparatoires rather than in legislation.145 He also describes Article 
3 as a codification of the rule of interpretation (skýringarreglan).146 Björgvinsson has elaborated this, 
and explained that Article 3 goes further than Protocol 35 by also giving non-implemented EEA rules 
status as lex specialis.147 
From the arguments above, it is clear that Article 3 is an insufficient implementation of the Sole 
Article of Protocol 35. The consequence of this is that according to Icelandic law one is not obliged to 
let implemented EEA law prevail over other domestic provisions. This can only be done by applying 
the Icelandic rule of interpretation, as Article 3 allows EEA conform results so far as appropriate. It is 
therefore necessary to outline the contents and limitations of this rule of interpretation by a study of 
Icelandic case law. 
5.2.4 Case law 
5.2.4.1 Interpreting wording of law in line with EEA law 
The case of Aresbank148 is a good example of how the Icelandic Supreme Court may conduct EEA 
consistent interpretation. In this horizontal case, a Spanish bank demanded reimbursement of deposit 
guarantee from Landsbanki, and the Court ended up rejecting this claim. The Court interpreted the 
meaning of ‘deposit’ in line with the EFTA Court’s opinion149 and relevant presumed implemented 
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EEA legislation.150 As the Supreme Court explained, this is in line with Article 3 of the EEA Act, 
which lets the meaning of ‘deposit’ according to the directive, be influential to whether the funds that 
the Spanish bank had paid Landsbanki could be considered ‘deposit’ according to domestic law.151 It is 
thus an example of the Court interpreting a domestic provision in line with EEA law. 
A similar example is found in Foss.152 In this case Flugstodir wanted to deem Foss’ right to the 
trademark ICEAVIA invalid, and the Court ruled in favour of Flugstodir. The Court stated that 
changes were made to the domestic act on trademark due to EEA obligations; the five-year rule in 
Article 25 of the domestic legal act153 was similar to Article 10 of the EEA directive.154 In this case, 
the Supreme Court interpreted ‘use’ as to mean ‘genuine use’, in line with EEA law. The situation in 
Foss is similar to the one in Aresbank, as they are examples of horizontal cases and they both concern 
interpretation of domestic provisions open to interpretation. 
Another example is the case of Kaupthing Isle of Man.155 This case concerned bankruptcy and fixing 
of estates in the aftermath of the 2008 financial crisis. The question was whether the CEO of Kaupþing 
held satisfactory authorization so that parental guarantee given by him should be deemed valid. The 
Court answered affirmative to this question. The Court presented EEA legislation on company law,156 
which was presumed implemented as legal background, which one has to have in mind when 
interpreting domestic legislation. It then interpreted the domestic legislation in line with EEA 
obligations.157  
Yet another example is found in Wow Air II.158 The case concerned allocation of time slots at Keflavik 
Airport, as Wow Air claimed Icelandair was given a competitive advantage in this aspect. The Court 
repeated the interpretation rule in Article 3, and referred to the decision of the District Court, who had 
interpreted domestic legislation159 in line with EEA law on grandfather rights, and ruled in favour of 
the Icelandic Competition Authority, Isavia and Icelandair. 
As the aforementioned case law show, EEA conform interpretation is possible when the legal text in 
question is open to interpretation. Other good examples are the cases of Jón Ásgeir and Sainz Maza,160 
where the Supreme Court found support in EEA law for their preferably narrow and wide 
                                                
150 Directive 94/19/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on deposit-guarantee schemes. 
151 Aresbank section VI. 
152 Hrd. 6 May 2009 (437/2008). 
153 Act No 45/1997 Um vörumerki (Trade Mark Act).  
154 First Council Directive 89/104/EEC on Trade Mark. Referred in section II of Foss. 
155 Hrd. 10 June 2011 (201/2011). 
156 Directive 68/151/EEC. Referred in section IV of Kaupthing Isle of Man. 
157 The case is discussed more thorough in Hannesson 2012 p. 182-183. 
158 Hrd. 18 February 2015 (95/2015). 
159 Regulation No 1050/2008 Um úthlutun afgreiðslutíma flugvalla (Allocation of time slots at airports). 
160 Hrd. 25 January 2007 (181/2006) Jón Ásgeir and Hrd. 18 October 2007 (107/2007) Sainz Maza. 
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interpretation of domestic provisions. Both cases concerned criminal proceedings against individuals, 
and are thus examples of vertical cases. In the case of Jón Ásgeir, who was accused of having violated 
Icelandic law on reporting of business loans in annual accounts, the Court concluded that they could 
not allow a wider interpretation of ‘loans’ and therefore Jón Ásgeir was acquitted. The Court based its 
narrow interpretation of loans on that such an understanding would be in line with EEA obligations 
and Council Directive 78/660/EEC. 
In the case of Sainz Maza, the Supreme Court upheld the verdict of the District Court, sentencing Mr 
Sainz Maza to six months in prison for having downloaded information from the company where he 
worked (data-theft). According to travaux préparatoires to the domestic law in question,161 it was 
meant to implement the Database directive.162 The Court stated that one should have this in mind when 
interpreting Article 50 of the domestic act on copyright,163 which they dedicated to the obligation in 
Article 3 of the EEA Agreement. Then the Court went on and interpreted Article 50 in light of the 
Directive, and argued that a wide interpretation of ‘database’ was in line with ECJ practice. 
Another example of a vertical case, where the wording of a domestic provision was open to 
interpretation is Wahl.164 In this case, a Norwegian citizen was denied entry to Iceland because of his 
affiliation with Hells Angels. The article of domestic law in question allowed for denying access to the 
country on essential grounds for public policy and public security. The Court explained that the 
Icelandic legislation was based on EEA law and therefore one had to take the rules of the Citizens’ 
Directive165 into account when interpreting the domestic law.166 This was not a problematic 
interpretation, as the wording of the domestic legislation needed further explanation as to what type of 
cases it applied to. 
All the aforementioned cases are examples where the domestic provisions in question were open to 
interpretation. It is clear from these examples that the Icelandic Supreme Court in these situations 
turns to EEA legislation and ECJ and EFTA Court practice to make sure that Icelandic provisions are 
interpreted in conformity with EEA obligations. This is similar to the approach of the Norwegian 
Supreme Court in the cases of Vesta and Hydro Aluminium. It appears that as a starting point, the two 
countries’ Supreme Courts do apply a similar approach to interpret their national provisions consistent 
with EEA law. It can be drawn from this that the interpretation rule in Iceland and the Norwegian 
principle of presumption are helpful tools in achieving EEA conformity where the wording of 
domestic provisions allows different readings. 
                                                
161 Act No 60/2000 um breyting á höfundalögum (Changes in law on copyright). 
162 Directive 96/9/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the legal protection of databases. 
163 Act No 73/1972 Höfundarlög (Copyright Act) 
164 Hrd. 17 October 2013 (191/2012). 
165 Directive 2004/38/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council on the rights of citizens. 
166 Wahl section V. 
In many cases, EEA law is not the tipping point of the interpretation conformed by the judges but it 
plays a part in the interpretation. The cases, which will be shortly mentioned below, show a similar 
Icelandic practice to cases briefly mentioned in the Norwegian experience. 
One example is the case of Vigfúsdóttir.167 This case concerned equal treatment and payment of men 
and women in employment cases. The Court stated that the legislation on equal pay168 was in line with 
other obligations of Icelandic law such as the Constitution, Icelandic regulations, as well as obligations 
following the EEA cooperation.169 Then the Court concluded that the difference in payment between 
two posts breached Icelandic legislation on equality between men and women. 
In Blaðamannafélag,170 which concerned transfer of enterprise, the Supreme Court applied EEA law to 
support their argument but still concluded that the domestic legislation did not entitle the journalist 
right to pay. In this case, the judges did not refer to any principle of interpretation nor Article 3 of the 
EEA Act, but they clearly applied EEA law as a tool in their interpretation of domestic legislation.171 
In other cases, the Supreme Court simply states that domestic legislation is in line with EEA law also 
without referring to any rule of interpretation. This was the case in Bilabúð Benna,172 which concerned 
criminal proceedings against a company and the owner for not complying with legislation on annual 
accounts.  
5.2.4.2 Leaving precedent case law 
I have not found examples of the Icelandic Supreme Court leaving earlier precedent practice in favour 
of reaching an EEA conform conclusion. As shown in the case of Norwegian Dental Depot, the 
Norwegian Supreme Court follows such practice. The Icelandic Supreme Court did leave earlier 
precedent practice in the case of Arnardóttir,173 a case with similar facts as the ones’ in Finanger I, but 
this was entitled to later changes in Icelandic law. As for the conclusion, the Court had a clear wording 
in domestic law174 that did not allow an EEA conform result. From this it is not possible to conclude 
whether both countries follow a tradition of setting aside precedent case law to achieve a result in 
conformity with EEA law.  
                                                
167 Hrd. 2000 bls. 2104 (Hrd. 31 May 2000 (11/2000)). 
168 Article 4 of Act No 28/1991 Um jafna stöðu og jafnan rétt kvenna og karla (Act on equal rights of men and 
women). 
169 Article 69 EEA and Council Directive 75/117/EEC. 
170 Hrd. 24 February 2005 (375/2004). The association for journalists sued the company of Frétt for not paying 
an employer what the newspaper they had just bought owed him. 
171 It can be worth mentioning that ESA concluded that the Supreme Court in this case interpreted law not 
entirely in accordance with the purpose of the implemented directive and relevant case law of the ECJ and EFTA 
Court. See ESA Reasoned Opinion 2010. Referred to in Hreinsson 2012 p. 96. 
172 Hrd. 21 November (265/2013). 
173 Hrd. 25 October 2001 (129/2001). 
174 Article 88 second paragraph of Act No 50/1987 Umferðalög (Traffic Act). 
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5.2.4.3 Clear and precise wording of law as limitation to consistent interpretation 
There are several examples of cases where clear and precise wording of domestic legislation prevents 
EEA consistent interpretation. The aforementioned case of Candy Spray,175 where a child had gotten 
injured from sour-blast-candy and the vendor and importer were held liable even though this 
conflicted with EEA law, is one example. This was the case where the Court was open to interpret the 
domestic legislation in line with non-implemented EEA law176 and it referred this to Article 3 of the 
EEA Act. The Court clearly stated that this rule of interpretation could not set the wording of Icelandic 
provisions aside, and that the specific provision in question did not allow for another interpretation 
even though it would make it consistent with EEA law. A different conclusion would result in giving 
EEA rules on liability for defective products horizontal direct effect. It is thus an example of the 
Icelandic Supreme Court rejecting EEA consistent interpretation of domestic provisions in a case with 
two private parties because it would be contra legem.177 
Another example of clear and precise wording of law as limitation to EEA conformity is the case of 
Gunnarsson.178 In this case, Mr Gunnarsson wanted a tax decision deemed invalid and in conflict with 
EEA law because the Icelandic State did not entitle him tax relief that he would have received if he 
domiciled in Iceland when he lived in Denmark. The Court found that Iceland had not implemented 
EEA law correctly, so therefore the Icelandic tax authorities could solely rely on the domestic 
legislation in their decision. The Court stated that the interpretation rule did not help the authorities to 
make a decision in line with EEA obligations179 because the domestic law was clear and precise and 
not in line with EEA law. 
The cases of Engilbertsson and Irish Bank180 are also examples of clear and precise wording as 
limitation to EEA conform results. The first case dealt with consumers’ rights concerning indexation 
of mortgage loans and the Court concluded that the loan agreement between Mr Engilbertsson and his 
bank did not breach domestic law. The relevant EEA legislation181 was not implemented in Iceland 
and the Court referred to the rule from Candy Spray that one cannot go away from wording of law. 
The Court considered the domestic provision182 to be sufficiently precise and not open to a different 
reading.183 The second case concerned an Irish bank’s right to lodge claims under the winding-up 
procedure of Kaupþing. The EFTA Court had considered the Icelandic legislation to be in conflict 
                                                
175 Hrd. 9 Desember 2010 (79/2010). 
176 Council Directive 85/374/EEC on product liability. 
177 Hannesson 2012 p. 186. 
178 Hrd. 2 Oktober 2014 (92/2013). 
179 Article 28 EEA and Directives 90/365/EEC and 2004/38/EC 
180 Hrd. 13 may 2015 (160/2015) Engilbertsson and Hrd. 27 February 2013 (89/2013) Irish Bank. 
181 Council Directive 87/102/EEC. 
182 Article 12 of Act No 121/1994 Um neytendalán (Act on Consumer Loans). 
183 Engilbertsson section IV. 
with EEA legislation and encouraged the national court to interpret Icelandic legislation in a way that 
undermined this difference.184 The Supreme Court concluded that domestic legislation185 did not allow 
the bank to submit its demands later than the time limit set, even though this would violate EEA 
law.186  
Finanger I showed that according to the Norwegian experience, one cannot interpret national law 
consistent with EEA law if the domestic provision is sufficiently clear and precise. The same appears 
to be the rule according to Icelandic case law. 
5.2.4.4 Loyalty to the Constitution as limitation to consistent interpretation 
Supreme Courts are often careful not to overstep its jurisdiction and into the power of the legislature. 
An example of this cautious behaviour of the Icelandic Supreme Court is the case of Stjörnugrís.187 
This is an example of a vertical case, where a pig farmer wanted a decision by the Minister of 
environment repealed. The Minister had decided that the building and operation of a pig farm, by the 
company of Stjörnugrís, would be subject to an environmental assessment. The Supreme Court ruled 
the decision to be unlawful because it should have had better foundation in written law. Even though 
the decision was in line with EEA law,188 it lacked legal basis in domestic law, and was thus in conflict 
with the principle of legality. The Court emphasized that it is up to the legislature to decide how a 
provision of EEA law shall be practiced.189  
In another vertical case, which concerned criminal proceedings against a driver who had not followed 
legal obligations on resting between driving,190 the Supreme Court ruled that the domestic provision in 
question was not sufficiently clear and precise to entitle a sentencing of the driver. An Icelandic 
regulation191 implemented the EEA legislation192 that allowed for such conviction, but it lacked a 
written provision to allow punishment. Even though a consistent interpretation allowed for sentencing 
the driver, such a conclusion would have breached the principle of legality.  
There is agreement on that the separation of powers and principle of legality are important limitations 
to the rule of interpretation, which is also the case in the Norwegian experience. Hreinsson has, among 
                                                
184 E-18/11. 
185 Article 118 of Act No 21/1991 Um gjaldþrotaskipti o.fl. (Act on Bankruptcy etc.). 
186 Article 14 first paragraph of Directive 2001/24/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council. 
187 Hrd. 13 April 2000 (15/2000). 
188 Council Directive 85/337/EEC on the assessment of the effects of certain public and private projects on the 
environment. 
189 Stjörnugrís section III. 
190 Hrd. 28 October 2004 (251/2004) Driving and Resting. 
191 Regulation No 136/1995 Um aksturs- og hvíldartíma ökumanna o.fl. (Driving and Resting) 
192 Council Regulation No 3820/85. 
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others, emphasized that there is no legislative power within the Court’s jurisdiction.193 These two cases 
show that the principle of legality plays a limiting role to the application of the rule of interpretation in 
Iceland. As Hannesson argues, they show that the Supreme Court seems to uphold a strict practice of 
legal predictability and the principle of legality.194  
The cases of Stjörnugrís and Driving and Resting, concern situations where an EEA conform result 
would allow putting negative obligations on private parties. If an EEA conform result would benefit 
the private party against the state, one could expect a different conclusion, as suggested in the 
Norwegian experience. As previously stated, the principles of legality and legal predictability are not 
applicable in the state’s defence.195 Case law show that this is not practiced consistently in the 
Icelandic experience. If one is to look at the case of Gunnarsson the criteria for state liability was not 
considered fulfilled.196 The case of Sainz Maza is also an example of an individual having to accept 
negative effects of the Court’s EEA conform interpretation.197  
The Court also found support for its outcome in Stjörnugrís in the Icelandic Constitution on rights to 
ownership and occupation.198 This shows how the constitution can play a limiting role to whether 
judges can let EEA consistent domestic legislation prevail over other domestic legislation. Another 
example is the case of Tobacco Marketing199 where the Court concluded in favour of visibility of 
tobacco products in a specific shop but not in favour of advertising such products. In this case, the 
Court bypassed EEA law by simply stating that they concern matters of the Icelandic Constitution. 
There are no similar examples in the Norwegian experience, but it follows from the principle of lex 
superior that constitutional law will prevail over other domestic legislation even though these were in 
line with EEA obligations. 
5.2.4.5 Unwillingness to conduct EEA consistent interpretation 
In the previously discussed ESA letter,200 the Supreme Court of Iceland is accused of not being willing 
to conform EEA consistent interpretation even though it is possible. In two cases referred to in the 
letter,201 the Supreme Court does not apply a method of consistent interpretation, nor do they take an 
active stand on what effect EEA law could have on domestic law, even though they, in ESA’s opinion, 
                                                
193 Hreinsson 2014 p. 290. 
194 Hannesson 2012 p. 192. 
195 Arnesen and Stenvik 2015 p. 144. 
196 Gunnarsson section VIII. 
197 As specified by Hannesson 2012 p. 193. 
198 Articles 72 and 75 of the Icelandic Constitution. 
199 Hrd. 6 April (220/2005). 
200 ESA letter 2016. 
201 Hrd. 28 October 2013 (552/2013) Commerzbank and Hrd. 8 May 2014 (120/2014) Nederlandsche Bank. 
should have done so. The question is whether the Supreme Court, in these cases, shows unwillingness 
to conduct EEA consistent interpretations. 
The Commerzbank case concerned Commerzbank’s right to set-off against counterclaims from 
Kaupþing. The Court referred to its previous rulings regarding whether this specific legal dispute 
should be solved by applying Icelandic or English law, and its decision that it should be solved under 
Icelandic legislation on rights to set-offs. Then, the Court concluded by confirming the conclusion of 
the District Court, that the conditions for conducting a set-off as put down in Article 100 first 
paragraph of Act No 21/1991,202 had not been met. In her reasoning, the District Court Judge did not 
seem to involve elements of EEA law when she considered whether the criteria of the Icelandic 
provision were met.203 
Nederlandsche Bank concerned the Central Bank of Holland’s demand to set-off against Landsbanki 
Íslands’ (LBI) account in the Central Bank, after the Central Bank had paid deposit holders of Icesave 
accounts in the Netherlands. The Court concluded in favour of the Icelandic bank. As done in 
Commerzbank, the Court decided to apply Article 100 first paragraph of the Act on Bankruptcy.204 
The conclusions of the Supreme Court in the two cases are due to special rules on winding-up 
proceedings, as the Icelandic counterpart in both cases had been subject to such proceedings. It is 
because of these rules that the Supreme Court ended up applying Article 100 first paragraph, instead 
of giving effect to Article 99 second paragraph letter j of Act No 161/2002,205 which would have 
allowed for application of British/Dutch law. The EFTA Surveillance Authority has stated that the 
Court, in these two cases, did not ensure creditors’ rights to set-off according to provisions of EEA 
legislation.206 Additionally, the Authority argues that since Article 99 second paragraph letter j is an 
implementation of EEA law, Protocol 35 of the EEA Agreement obligates the Court to let this rule 
prevail over other domestic legislation.207 In addition to this, ESA reminds Iceland of obligations of 
the Courts to interpret national law as far as possible in conformity with EEA legislation in line with 
the principle of conform interpretation.208 These cases represent specific examples of the incomplete 
implementation of Protocol 35 becoming a problem, as Article 3 of the Icelandic EEA Act does not 
ensure that implemented EEA law prevails over other domestic provisions. 
As previously explained in this study, the national courts of Iceland and Norway are obliged to 
interpret domestic law in line with EEA law where possible. This is in accordance with their national 
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legal tradition, e.g. the principle of presumption and the interpretation rule, as well as in accordance 
with EEA obligations. As pointed out above, the judges could have interpreted and practiced Icelandic 
provisions in line with EEA law in the cases of Commerzbank and Nederlandsche Bank. The 
judgements thus show that in the Icelandic experience one does not practice an interpretation rule in 
line with the EU/EEA criteria on taking the whole body of law into consideration. I have suggested 
that this also might be the case in the Norwegian experience. 
One last example to the Court’s unwillingness to ensure effectiveness of EEA law through consistent 
interpretation is shown in the cases of Kolbeinsson.209 The first case concerned Mr Kolbeinsson’s 
claim to insurance for injury following a work related accident. His claim was refused because of his 
own negligence. The Court did not interpret domestic law210 in line with EEA legislation; in fact EEA 
law is not even mentioned in the judgement. Because of this decision, Mr Kolbeinsson claimed 
Iceland for state liability in the second case. He claimed that he was denied insurance due to incorrect 
implementation of EEA law211 and this claim was denied. Even though the Supreme Court in Candy 
Spray seemed open to let non-implemented and not correctly implemented EEA law influence 
interpretation of domestic legislation, the example of Kolbeinsson I and II shows that this is not 
practiced. It is thus an example of the Supreme Court being less willing to conduct an EEA conform 
interpretation where EEA legislation is not (correctly) implemented in Icelandic law.212 
5.2.4.6 EEA conform interpretation to avoid state liability 
The case of Sveinbjörnsdóttir213 suggests that the responsibility to follow EEA obligations relies on the 
states. The case concerned state liability after Ms Sveinbjörnsdóttir’s was denied pay from the 
payment guarantee fund in the winding-up process of the business where she worked in line with 
Icelandic law.214 The Court decided that the state had to pay Ms Sveinbjörnsdóttir compensation due to 
its incorrect implementation of EEA law.215 The Court stated that the conflict between the regulation 
and the domestic law would clearly benefit the state if the interpretation rule laid down in Article 3 of 
the EEA Act did not allow for a different interpretation.216 From this, one can conclude that the 
Supreme Court of Iceland considers the interpretation rule as a tool to avoid state liability where 
possible. By this, that state liability is considered an alternative to reach an EEA conform result. Such 
                                                
209 Hrd. 20 Desember 2005 (246/2005) Kolbeinsson I and Hrd. 21 February 2012 (532/2012) Kolbeinsson II. 
210 Article 26 first paragraph of Act No 46/1980 Um aðbúnað, hollustuhætti og öryggi á vinnustöðum (Act on 
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He concludes that the state was wrong in denying Ms Sveinbjörndóttir payment from the Guarantee Fund and 
considered the decision to be in breach with domestic law. 
216 Sveinbjörnsdóttir section IV. 
an argument is not found in cases from the Norwegian experience, but in this regard, it is worth 
mentioning that Miss Finanger got compensation for her loss in a later case on state liability.217  
This line of thought must not be stretched too far, as one cannot always rely on state liability where 
EEA consistent interpretation does not lead to an EEA conform result. As the cases of Gunnarsson 
and Kolbeinsson II both show. In both cases, the Supreme Court concluded that the incorrect 
implementation of EEA law did not entail a serious enough breach to qualify state liability.  
5.2.5 Concluding remarks on the Icelandic experience 
This study shows that the Icelandic Supreme Court, in most cases,218 refers to Article 3 of the EEA Act 
as legal basis and explanation for interpreting domestic provisions in line with EEA law. In some 
cases, the Court does not refer to a specific rule of interpretation, but it is clear from the judges’ 
reasoning that they are conducting an interpretation of domestic provisions in light of EEA 
obligations.219 The study also shows that the judges keep within precise and clear wording of domestic 
provisions and that they conduct EEA conform interpretation if possible where the wording is 
ambiguous. Whether the Supreme Court would leave precedent practice to land on an EEA conform 
result is unclear. 
Experience in Icelandic case law shows different results concerning loyalty to the Constitution and 
state liability as a way of ensuring individual’s rights following EEA legislation. It is therefore 
difficult to conclude from the cases here referred to. But in my opinion, this shows that individual’s 
rights following EEA law is not sufficiently preserved in the Icelandic practice of consistent 
interpretation. This is also shown in the Supreme Court’s unwillingness to conduct EEA conform 
interpretation even though it could be possible. The case of Candy Spray presents interpretation tools 
to avoid this, but the Court does seemingly not practice these. The same goes for the EU/EEA rule of 
taking the whole body of law into consideration.  
One explanation to this practice might be that the Icelandic Supreme Court often focuses on method 
instead of focusing on reaching an EEA conform result. The Court instead refers to the interpretation 
rule of Article 3 as well as the limitation to keep with wording of domestic provisions as outlined in 
Candy Spray. By this, the Court practices a strict relationship to the dualist principle of letting 
domestic provisions prevail over EEA law, instead of reading the domestic provision in a way that 
would ensure effectiveness of EEA law. These elements show that the so far as possible criteria, in the 
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218 Wow Air II, Aresbank, Gunnarsson, Wahl, Candy Spray, Foss, Sainz Maza, Arnardóttir and Vigfúsdóttir. 
219 Stjörnugris, Driving and Resting, Jón Ásgeir and Kaupthing Isle of Man. 
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Icelandic experience, is strictly limited by the Court’s loyalty to the legislature and the wording of 
domestic law. 
6 Summarizing the two Countries’ Experience 
The principle of consistent interpretation is not about setting domestic law aside, but about interpreting 
EEA law into domestic legislation. The principle is neither about giving EEA law primacy, but about 
giving effect to EEA law within domestic legislation. Both Iceland and Norway practice interpretation 
rules which enables this so far as possible, but it seems there are limits within this criteria that prevent 
domestic provisions from giving effect to EEA law even though it should be possible. This practice is 
often explained as a consequence of the principle of legality and the dualist approach, which in my 
opinion shows a misunderstanding of the definition of consistent interpretation. If consistent 
interpretation is practiced correctly it should not lead to a conclusion that would breach with neither 
the principle of legality nor dualism. Only if the conflict is so clear that an EEA conform interpretation 
is not possible should the Court end up with a conclusion in conflict with EEA law. 
Both Iceland and Norway have their own version of consistent interpretation following their legal 
traditions. Regarding EEA cases, the Icelandic Supreme Court seems to practice a written 
interpretation rule whereas the Norwegian Supreme Court follows the unwritten principle of 
presumption. The Icelandic Court tends to specifically refer to a rule of interpretation as well as an 
obligation to follow EEA law. Though this is not always the case, it at least seems like they do this 
more frequently than their Norwegian counterpart, who also leans on EEA obligations as basis for 
their unwritten interpretation rule. As for the so far as possible criteria, none of the Courts explicitly 
outline its limits, and the conclusion must therefore be based on case law results. 
It seems like in Iceland one is more focused on method, different from the Norwegian Courts where 
the focus is on reaching an EEA conform result. The difference in the Courts’ focus makes them 
practice different methods in ensuring individuals’ rights following EEA legislation, as well as making 
them practice a different relationship of loyalty to the legislature in vertical cases. This gives the 
criteria of so far as possible a different meaning in the Icelandic and Norwegian experience with 
consistent interpretation. 
The Icelandic and Norwegian Supreme Courts both seem to follow the limitation of not to rule 
inconsistent with clear and precise wording of domestic law. However, it is unclear whether the 
Icelandic Court would let EEA law prevail over precedent from earlier cases, like in the Norwegian 
experience. Case law also suggests that both Courts refrain from taking the whole body of law into 
consideration when conducting consistent interpretation, which shows a similar limitation to the so far 
as possible criteria.  
The cases of Kolbeinsson, Gunnarsson, Commerzbank and Nederlandsche Bank, show that the 
Icelandic Supreme Court can find it difficult to mend wrongful implementations of EEA legislation. A 
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similar situation is not found in the Norwegian experience. This can be linked to a distinction in the 
countries’ practice of loyalty to the legislature in vertical cases, as well as their different approach to 
the dualist principle of letting domestic law prevail over EEA law. I would therefore agree with 
Franklin and Fredriksen when they argue that the Icelandic Supreme Court seems «less willing to 
remedy deficient implementation (…) than its Norwegian counterpart».220  
The cases on state liability suggest state liability as a substitute to EEA conform results through 
consistent interpretation. But it is important to bear in mind that the threshold to receive this 
compensation can be difficult to reach, as the cases of Gunnarsson and Kolbeinsson II show. The 
courts should therefore not consider state liability as an alternative solution where they are not ready to 
reach an EEA conform conclusion through interpretation. In addition to this, for some, compensation 
is just a small comfort for not getting what they are entitled to after EEA law. 
                                                
220 Franklin and Fredriksen 2015 p. 667. 
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